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Community Property Considerations in Ohio Estate Planning:
Expecting the Unexpected
FOR THE LAWYER IN THE COMMUNITY PROPERTY STATE, 1 the laws
peculiar to community property are familiar ground, having in
all probability made up at least a part of the law school curriculum.
For the lawyer in the common law state, community property laws
are generally something to be read about in the newspaper when the
husband or wife of a movie star lands a huge divorce settlement
due to the operation of the community property laws in California.
But it is quite realistic to state that whether the attorneys in the
common law states know it or not, they are in fact likely to encounter
the operation of community property laws at some time during their
practice. Indeed, if they fail (or worse, have failed) to determine
whether any community property laws operate on the estate plans of
any of their clients, such failure might amount to malpractice, if the
client suffers economic detriment.2
The more positive side of the picture, of course, is that given the
fact that a substantial percentage of those persons who move from
1 Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico, Texas, and Washington. In
addition, a number of foreign countries, such as Canada, England, Scotland, France, Ger-
many, Spain, and others, are community property countries. Moreover, a number of other
states, including Michigan, Pennsylvania, Oklahoma, Hawaii, Nebraska, and Oregon, had
community property statutes for a time, but dropped them when Congress enacted legisla-
tion allowing joint federal income tax returns for spouses. N. LAY, TAX AND ESTATE
PLANNING FOR COMMUNITY PROPERTY AND THE MIGRANT CLIENT 1-6 (1970) [here-
inafter cited as N. LAY.)
2 The following figures demonstrate the likelihood of some encounter with community prop-
erty lawi:
Of roughly two hundred million persons in the United States in the two-year average
period March, 1969 -March, 1971, 18% or approximately one of five, moved during the
period. As a factor of total population, an average of 3.5% moved from one state to an-
other, each year. U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED
STATES, 1972, at 36. [hereinafter cited as ABSTRACT]
The following chart of net migration for the community property states and for the
United States as a whole during the period of 1960-1970, along with figures regarding
total population change, gives one some idea of the likelihood of encounter with com-
munity property laws. ABSTRACT, supra, at 11.
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state to state are executives and sales personnel of large multi-state
corporations, special opportunities arise for the attorneys they leave
behind, or the attorneys they consult upon their arrival at their new
locations, for intelligent estate planning. This note will outline the
basic problems of moves to and from community property states, and
will point toward the solutions of these problems.
General Outline of Community Property Laws
Community property is generally defined negatively. Community
property states take pains to define that which is separate property,
such as property acquired before marriage, property in trust for
one spouse, gifts to one spouse, and the like, and then call all the rest
community property. For our purposes, however, it will be helpful to
have a positive definition. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in
Hammonds v. Commissioner4 held that community property was
whatever is gained during coverture by the toil, talent, or other pro-
ductive faculty of either spouse. Hammonds was an income taxation
case, in which Mrs. Hammonds held certain oil leases. Since the case
was heard before the enactment of the provisions allowing joint re-
turns by husbands and wives, the community property states had
a distinct income tax advantage. Community property states allowed
married persons to split income from community property in their
separate income tax returns. This is what Mr. and Mrs. Hammonds
did in this case, despite the fact that the income-producing oil leases
were all in Mrs. Hammonds' name. The court held for the taxpayers,
under its definition of community property as set out above.
Whether real property is to be treated as separate or as com-
munity property is determined by the law of the situs of the prop-
erty.5 Even if the husband and wife reside in a community property
state, if they own real property in a non-community state, that prop-
erty is not community property.6 Similarly, if a husband and wife
live in a non-community state and buy real property in a community
state, that real property is community property. But in this instance,
there is an option. If for any reason the husband and wife wish to
keep it as separate property, and if separate funds are used for the
purchase, the property can retain its characteristic of separateness.
7
3 See generally, N. LAY, supra note 1, at 37-53; de Funiak, A Review in Brief of Principles
of Community Property, 32 KY. L. REv. 63 (1943).
4 106 F.2d 420 (10th Cir. 1939).
-La Selle v. Woolery, 14 Wash. 70, 44 P. 115 (1896) (dicta).
6Id.
7 Burlingham v. Burlingham, 72 N.M. 433, 384 P.2d 699 (1963).
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As to personal property, the law of the state of the taxpayer's
domicile determines whether personal property is community or sep-
arate; and any artificial means to defeat the community, except as
permitted by statute or case law, will meet with failure.
In times past, community property states jealously guarded their
system of property in the face of voluntary attempts by married
couples to separate the property,8 and also by creditors to attach the
property of one spouse or the other, as separate property. In all com-
munity property states it is a good deal easier to convert community
to separate property.9 The simplest method, effective in all com-
munity property states, is by gift. It is imperative, however, that
the local law be consulted, for in more than one state, a writing is
necessary. 10 In Louisiana, however, the opposite is true -the gift
cannot take the form of a written contract."
That rents and profits from community assets are themselves
community property goes almost without saying, under the positive
definition outlined above. The difficulty arises when the rents, profits,
and gains come during coverture from the separate property of the
husband or the wife. Jurisdictions vary on this point. For example,
in California, they are separate property ;12 but in Texas they are com-
munity property.1 3 In a bizarre case in which a husband held prop-
erty in one community property state in which rents were separate
property, while he lived in another state in which rents were com-
munity property, the court held that the rents were separate property
for federal tax purposes. 14
8 See, e.g., King v. Bruce, 145 Tex. 647, 201 S.W.2d 803 (1947), cert denied, 332 U.S.
769 (1947), rehearing denied, 332 U.S. 820 (1947).
9ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §25-214 (Supp. 1973); CAL. CIrV. CODE §§158, 161,683 (Deering
1960), CAL. FINANCIAL CODE §852 (Deering 1964); IDAHO CODE ANN. §32-906
(1963); LA. CIVIL CODE ANN. §§1746, 2329, 2332 (West 1971); NEVADA REV. STAT.
§§123.070, 123.080(1), 123.030 (1957); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§57-2-6, 57-2-12 (1962);
TEX CONST. art. 16, §15, as amended, (1948); TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. §46 (1956), as
amended, TEXAS LAWS ch. 641 §3 p. 1922 (1969); WASH. REV. CODE §26.16.050,
26.16.120 (1961); Hobbs v. Hobbs, 69 Idaho 201, 204 P.2d 1034 (1949); Shroff v.
Deaton, 220 S.W.2d 489 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949); Scott v. Currie, 7 Wash. 2d 301, 109
P.2d 526 (1941).
It California, Louisiana, Texas, and Washington. Statutes cite in note 9 supra.
11 See LA. CIVIL CODE ANN. §§1746, 2329-2332 (West 1972).
12CAL. CIVIL CODE §§5107-08 (Deering 1971); they are also separate property in four other
jurisdictions: ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §25-215 (1956); NEV. REV. STAT. §123.30 (1967);
N.M. STAT. ANN. §§57-3-4, 57-3-5 (1962); WASH. REV. CODE §§26.16.010 (1961).
13 TEx FAMILY CODE §5.01 (1969); King v. Matney, 259 S.W.2d 606 (Tex. Civ. App.
1953); they are also community in two others: IDAHO CODE §32-903 (1947); LA. CIVIL
CODE ANN. art. 2334-35 (1952).
14Commissioner v. Skaggs, 122 F.2d 721 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 315 U.S. 811 (1941).
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Generally, property acquired before marriage by one spouse or
the other will retain its character as separate property,15 except in
cases of commingling or fraud upon creditors.
Property received by one spouse or the other by gift or inherit-
ance, whether acquired before or after marriage, will in most cases
remain separate property. 16 The most obvious corollary of this prin-
ciple is that simple and effective conversion from community to sep-
arate property may be accomplished by gift from one spouse to the
other.17
Property received by gift or inheritance to both spouses is com-
munity property. 18 Property acquired by the sale or exchange of sep-
arate property retains its character as separate property if and only
if the property so acquired is carefully labeled as separate.19 Property
acquired from the sale or exchange of community property, or with
community credit, is community property.2 0
There is a split of authority among community property states
with regard to property acquired from the sale or exchange of
"mixed" property, consisting of both community and separate prop-
erty. Some jurisdictions maintain that the property so acquired re-
tains proportionate community-separate identity in accordance with
the amounts of contributions of community and of separate property,
to aggregate the purchase of the new property.21 Other states, notably
Louisiana, call the new property community, and give the contributor
of separate property creditor status to the extent of the value of his
or her separate property contribution.22
15 Rico v. Brandenstein, 98 Cal. 465, 33 P. 480 (1893); Kohny v. Dunbar, 21 Idaho 258,
121 P. 544 (1912); Routh v. Routh, 9 Rob. (La.) 224, 41 Am. Dec. 326 (1844);
Brookman v. Durkee, 46 Wash. 578, 90 P. 914 (1907).
16 Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101 (1930); Hatch v. Ferguson, 68 F. 43 (9th Cir. 1895); Rico
v. Brandenstein, 98 Cal. 465, 33 P. 480 (1893); Kohny v. Dunbar, 21 Idaho 258, 121 P.
544 (1912); Dixon v. Sanderson, 72 Tex. 359, 10 S.W. 535 (1888); Brookman v.
Durkee, 46 Wash. 578, 90 P. 914 (1907).
17 Germania Fire Ins. Co. v. Bally, 19 Ariz. 580, 173 P. 1052 (1918); Odone v. Marzocchi,
34 Cal. 2d 431, 211 P.2d 297, hearing denied, 34 Cal. 2d 431, 212 P.2d 233 (1949);
Reed v. Reed, 283 S.W.2d 311 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955). It should be noted, however,
that such a gift would be subject to taxation.
18 In re Salvini's Estate, 65 Wash. 2d 442, 397 P.2d 811 (1964).
19 Burlingham v. Burlingham, 72 N.M. 433, 384 P.2d 699 (1963); E.I. DuPont de Nemour
& Co., Inc. v. Garrison, 13 Wash. 2d 170, 124 P.2d 939 (1942).
2Warburton v. White, 176 U.S. 484 (1900); Gillis v. Gillis, 435 S.W.2d 171 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1968).
21 Fellows v. Fellows, 106 Cal. App. 681, 289 P. 887 (1930); Schuster v. Bauman Jewelry
Co., 79 Tex. 179, 15 S.W. 259 (1890); Heintz v. Brown, 46 Wash. 387, 90 P. 211
(1907).
22 Burns v. Thompson, 39 La. Ann. 377, 1 So. 913 (1887).
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There is a split of authority, too, with respect to damages
awarded or received in a civil action for personal injury to one
spouse. California and Nevada consider such awards as the separate
property of the spouse to whom they were awarded.2 3 Arizona, Idaho,
Texas, and Washington consider such damages community property. 24
In Louisiana, if the husband is the injured party, the award is com-
munity property.25 If the wife is injured, damages for pain and suf-
fering are her separate property,26 but damages for medical expenses
and loss of earnings are community property.27 New Mexico treats
general and special damages in the same manner as does Louisiana,
but makes no distinction whether it is the husband or the wife who
is injured. In New Mexico, therefore, general damages are separate
property, and special damages are community property.28
With respect to life insurance proceeds, the law in the various
community property jurisdictions is exceedingly complex and diverse.
Suffice it to say that when planning the estates of a family which
moved from a community property state into a common law state,
more than just the pure incidents of ownership will have a bearing
upon the taxability of the proceeds in the decedent's estate. If a life
insurance policy on the life of either spouse was paid for in whole
or in part with community funds, both spouses have an interest in
that policy, and the law of the jurisdiction from which they came
should be carefully checked.2 9
Community Property and Common Law Property Compared
The "statutory interest" or "non-barrable share" of a spouse in
a common law state attaches to all of the property of the other spouse,
whether previously or subsequently acquired, and attaches both to
purchases and to gifts and inheritances. Such is not the case in com-
munity property jurisdictions. 3 0 In the latter states, there is no statu-
tory share in the other spouse's separate property.
2 CAL. CIV. CODE §163.5 (Deering 1960); Underhill v. Anciaux, 68 Nev. 69, 226 P.2d
794 (1951), disapproved on other grounds, Shoshone Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Dolinski,
82 Nev. 439, 420 P.2d 855 (1966).
2Tinker v. Hobbs, 80 Ariz. 166, 294 P.2d 659 (1956); Clark v. Foster, 391 P.2d 853
(Idaho 1964); Glens Falls Ins. Co. v. Yarbrough, 369 S.W.2d 640 (Tex. Civ. App.
1963); Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Leatherman, 351 S.W.2d 633 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961); Chase
v. Beard, 55 Wash. 2d 58, 346 P.2d 315 (1959).
25 McHenry v. American Employers' Ins. Co., 206 La. 70, 18 So. 2d 656 (1944).
26LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2402 (West 1952); Sanders v. P. & S. Ins. Co., 125 So. 2d 24
(La. App. 1960).
27 Johnson v. Shreveport Transit Co., 137 So. 2d 463 (La. App. 1962).
28 Soto v. Vandeventer, 56 N.M. 483, 245 P.2d 826 (1952); Richards v. Richards, 59 N.M.
308, 283 P.2d 881 (1955).
2 For a good general discussion of insurance in community property states, see 1 H. WREN,
CREATIVE ESTATE PLANNING 99-105 (1970); N. LAY, supra note 1, at 28-33.
30McClanahan, Property Problems of the Migrant Client: A Statutory Solution, III TRUSTS
AND ESTATES 950 (1972).
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The common law statutory interest is non-possessory. The com-
munity interest is present, possessory, and co-equal. 31 The common
law non-acquiring spouse has no management control or other ele-
ments of ownership during life, especially when the property is in
the name of the husband. In community states, the husband is
usually given management rights over the community, but as pre-
viously stated, ownership is co-equal. This particular facet of com-
munity property law has significant bearing upon federal estate tax
planning, as will be discussed later. In addition, whether this facet
of community property law is honored or ignored by a common law
state to which the couple removes, will have a bearing upon the state
inheritance or estate tax liability, as will also be discussed.
It should be noted at this point that while in common law states
the non-acquiring spouse has no elements of ownership during life,
the acquiring spouse is still not free to dispose of the property and
ignore the statutory interest of the other spouse. Ohio Revised Code
§2103.02 is typical, in this regard, in stating that the statutory dower
right of the non-acquiring spouse arises at the death of the other, or
when the acquiring spouse sells or encumbers the real property with-
out obtaining the release of the statutory interest of the other. In
community property states, by contrast, the holder of separate prop-
erty may dispose of it at will, inter vivos or by testamentary disposi-
tion to anyone, without regard for the form of title or any imagined
interest of the other.32 This gives rise to an interesting problem.
If a family whose assets are all in the husband's name but are
in fact community property moves from a community property state
to a non-community state, and the husband then dies intestate or
leaves his property by will to someone other than his wife, perhaps
in reliance upon what he knew would happen in the community
state (half automatically, in fee, to the wife), the wife's former man-
datory one-half of all community could be reduced from that one-half
to a maximum of one-fourth to one-half in fee, down to a minimum
of a life estate in one-third of all of the property, depending upon the
laws of the state to which they had moved.33
Assume, for example, that a husband and wife and two children
move from California to Ohio, and that shortly after the move, the
husband dies intestate. Under Ohio Revised Code §2105.06, the wife
would receive one-third of the estate in fee, and the children would
receive the other two-thirds. If the husband had died in California,
the wife would automatically own her community one-half, plus what-
ever share of the husband's one-half would pass to her under Cali-
31Id. at 951.
32 Id.
33 Id. at 952, citing MARSH, MARITAL PROPERTY IN CONFLICT OF LAWS 27-58 (1952).
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fornia's law of descent and distribution. If the wife needed more
than her Ohio statutory share to live on, or if for any other reason
she was required to sell property passing to the children under
§2105.06, a costly and time-consuming process of sale of property
out of the guardianship would result.
The ABA Section of Real Property, Probate, and Trust Law,
Committee on Property Problems of the Migrant Client, has proposed
a Uniform Law mandating that in cases such as this, the decedent's
property is treated as it would be if he or she had died domiciled in
the state in which the property was acquired.34
One distinct advantage enjoyed by residents of community prop-
erty states, and by those who were fortunate enough or astute enough
to keep property in community after a move out of a community
property state is that upon the death of one, (his) half will pass
according to his will to devisees and legatees and will acquire a
stepped-up basis to fair market value in the process and, more im-
portant, so will the one-half passing to the surviving spouse, despite
the fact that (her) half did not pass through decedent's estate, as is
normally required by §1014 of the Internal Revenue Code.
It is difficult to explain exactly why this phenomenon exists,
especially since no specific language to this effect appears in either
§1014 or §2040 of the Code. Yet all of the text writers are clear and
unequivocal on the subject, however, and there are cases so holding.35
The mechanics and effect of the step-up in basis of the survivor's
one-half are not unlike the operation of the §2056 marital deduction
under which, when up to one-half of the husband's adjusted gross
estate passes to the wife, it is exempted from federal estate taxation
and yet, since it did pass to the wife through the husband's estate,
the wife takes the property at a stepped-up basis under §1014. There
is still an advantage in owning community property as opposed to
owning common law property and taking advantage of the marital
deduction, as the operation of the community system has none of the
strictures of §2056 leaning toward eventual inclusion of the marital
deduction property in the wife's estate, and as the community system
requires no positive steps by husband or wife in pre-death or post-
death planning to avail themselves of the marital deduction. It hap-
pens automatically. 36
3 McClanahan, supra note 30, at 953.
3SBordenave v. United States, 150 F. Supp. 820 (S.D. Cal. 1957);Vinnie A. Murphy, 41
T.C. 608 (1964), af'd sub nom. Murphy v. Commissioner 342 F.2d 356 (9th Cir. 1965);
Laura Massaglia, 33 T.C. 379, a/'d sub nom. Massaglia v. Commissioner 286 F.2d 258
(10th Cit. 1961).
3 Lest the reader conversant with estate planning techniques assume that election of the
maximum marital deduction (and no more) is a foregone conclusion, he is referred to the
1949 statistics quoted by Dean Wren, indicating that where there are wills extant, the vast
(Continued on next page)
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The difference between the two systems with regard to step-up
in basis arises most graphically in some of the common law substi-
tutes for community property, such as joint tenancy or tenancy in
common. Under §2040, all of the value of property held jointly by
the married couple is included in the husband's estate if he pre-
deceases his wife, and yet, since the wife's interest passes to her
directly, by contract as it were, there is no §1014 step-up in basis.3 6 a
Obviously, if the husband's interest were a tenancy in common with
a value of one-half the total value of the property, only that one-half
would be in his estate, and the wife's one-half would be hers as it
was before, but at the old basis.
At the risk of being repetitive, community property presents the
best features of both, plus an added benefit: only one-half of the com-
munity is included in the husband's estate, and the wife's half auto-
matically receives a stepped-up basis when, at the husband's death,
the community is severed and the wife's community one-half becomes
her separate property. This advantage to the community property
system should never be overlooked when planning for the family
moving into or out of a community state, especially if any substantial
portion of the couple's property will appreciate or has appreciated in
value.
Another significant area of difference between community and
common law states is in the treatment which must be accorded
marital deductions in estates and gifts, under Code §§2056 and 2523.
In the estate tax area, the law is complex. The basic rule is that
since community property acts much like an "automatic" §2056
marital deduction, the executor must deduct the value of the com-
munity property held by decedent at date of death, in figuring the
adjusted gross estate for marital deduction purposes.3 7 For example,
if the married couple owned $200,000.00 worth of property in com-
munity, upon the husband's death $100,000.00 would pass automati-
cally to the wife. The husband could not leave the remaining $100,
000.00 to her tax free under the §2056 marital deduction provisions.
He must exclude the value of all community property in which he had
an interest, thus reducing his adjusted gross estate (for marital de-
duction purposes) to zero, making any portion of his remaining
$100,000.00 which passes to the wife under his will, fully taxable.
The complexity arises in the area of community property con-
verted to noncommunity, before death. In most cases it, too, must be
(Continued from preceding page)
majority name the spouse as sole legatee, and that only nineteen percent of the adult popu-
lation, and only forty-one percent of the one-third wealthiest Americans, even have wills!
6 R. POWELL, REAL PROPERTY 606 n.2 (1958), quoted in 2 H. WREN, CREATIVE
ESTATE PLANNING §10.02[3), at 817, 819 (1970).
36a Provided that the decedent died before 1954.
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excluded from decedent's adjusted gross estate. A thorough review
of §2056 and its regulations is necessary whenever it comes to the
attention of counsel that decedent had once been possessed of com-
munity property. 38 This is especially important for the practicioner
in a noncommunity state, when planning for clients who at any time
in the past lived in a community property jurisdiction.
The same peculiarities with respect to deduction of community
property from the adjusted gross estate when using the §2056 marital
deduction apply to §2523 inter-spousal gifts of community property.
These provisions should be borne in mind when filing gift tax returns
on inter-spousal gifts given for the purpose of separating community
property. §2523 of the Internal Revenue Code provides a marital de-
duction for gifts from one spouse to the other. If, for example, a
husband owns property worth $20,000.00 and he gives it to his wife,
§2523 states that half the value of the gift is exempted from tax,
so that in our example, the gift is taxable only in the amount of
$10,000.00. The section contains the same prohibition as does §2056,
however, against using the deduction if the donated property is com-
munity property. The result, however, is the same as if the deduction
were available. In the example, if the $20,000.00 property in the
husband's name were really community, he would in effect only own
half of it, so that a gift from him to the wife of his entire interest
would in fact be a gift of only $10,000.00. As in the case of the estate
tax marital deduction, however, the entire $10,000.00 is a taxable
gift. He has no marital deduction for that portion, which effectively
erases the former advantage held by those residing in community
property states.
Overall, even though the joint return provisions of the Internal
Revenue Code eliminated what had formerly been the most desirable
aspect of community property, there are some advantages in holding
property in community rather than in any other form, most of which
have already been outlined. The two most important advantages are
the stepped-up basis of the survivor's half, and, for most persons,
the fact that the community property laws operate independent of
any positive election to take advantage of the marital deduction. Most
persons fail to adequately plan their estates, and an automatic statu-
tory estate plan in the form of community property laws operates to
the advantage of such persons.
There are, however, some disadvantages in holding community
property. First, the more property that is held as community, the
more that is locked into a 50-50 split, and the less that is available
for flexible planning once the wife has enough to sustain her, or is
3 An excellent general discussion of the availability, and an outline of trouble spots, may be
found in N. LAY, supra note 1, at 194-201.
[Vol. 23:470
9Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1974
COMMUNITY PROPERTY CONSIDERATIONS
given enough outright, or has separate property. In other words, it
is tantamount to a mandated maximum marital deduction, which is
not always desirable.39
Second, the community property system has disadvantages in
the area of small business. If a business is started by a husband in a
community property state, his wife owns half of it, especially if com-
munity property is used as the initial capital for the business. If his
labors during marriage increase its value, and if his wife dies first,
IRS will tax the one-half of the business she owned, which financial
drain may well hurt the company or the husband or both. If she
leaves her half of the business to someone other than her husband,
perhaps unwittingly, or if she places her half in trust, the husband
has intruders in the business which he did not have before his wife's
death.40
The only method of avoiding either of these undesirable effects
is by severance of the community property, preferably before the
business venture is begun, coupled with a written agreement be-
tween husband and wife that the business, its capital and its earnings,
is to be and remain the separate property of the husband. Whether
such an agreement will be honored, especially in a state such as Texas
that considers rents, profits, and gains from separate property dur-
ing coverture community property, is doubtful. 41 Moreover, such a
severance of the community might be an unwise tax move, since the
benign attribute of community property resulting in stepped-up basis
for the survivor's half of the community upon the death of the other
spouse, would be obviated. Such a consideration might become critical
if there had been substantial appreciation in the value of the business
as a capital asset.
The third disadvantage in holding community property, and
probably most important from the viewpoint of the planner, is the
effect of community property laws on the unhappy family. Obviously,
in most cases it is desirable to equalize the estates of husband and
wife for planning purposes. If the planner counseling a couple who
is moving to or has just moved from a community property state is
told that there is domestic difficulty and that a divorce may be in the
making, he not only has the usual difficulties attendant to such a dis-
39 Logan, Moore, Schwartz (Halbach, Moderator), Estate Planning for the Migratory Execu-
tive: A Panel, 5 REAL PROP., PROBATE & TR. J. 407 (1970), at 449 (hereinafter cited as
Panel]; see 2 H. WREN, CREATIVE ESTATE PLANNING §§12.04-12.07, at 955-975 (1970).
40 Id. at 453.




CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
closure when planning estates, but has them compounded by the
knowledge of what the community laws may do to any attempt to
purposely create imbalance, for whatever reason.
Migration From Community to Non-Community States
Theoretically, property acquired when the couple was domiciled
in the community property state will retain its community character
when the couple moves to a non-community state.42 The problem
arises in getting the non-community state to recognize the com-
munity property, if desired, or to recognize a conversion, if the par-
ticular estate plan makes a separation of the community property
advantageous.
No non-community state recognizes community as a separate
system of titleholding.4 Those which do recognize the retention of
community characteristics generally allow title to stand in the form
chosen by the couple upon their arrival in the non-community state,
imposing a constructive trust for the benefit of the other, if
necessary."
If the community property is left in the community state, some
(but not all) of the problems are eliminated. In Succession of Pack-
wood,45 husband and wife moved from Louisiana to New York leav-
ing certain real property in Louisiana. That property produced sugar
cane which was sold, and the proceeds were placed in a bank in
Louisiana. The bank sent negotiable certificates of deposit to the
husband in New York. After the wife died in New York, the hus-
band tried to sell his deceased wife's part of the land in Louisiana,
and did not declare any of the proceeds of the sugar cane sale as
hers. The heirs sued in Louisiana, challenging both of the husband's
actions.
The Louisiana court held that the interest in the personal prop-
erty was governed by the state of domicile at death, and that if the
heirs were to include the money from the sugar cane sale in the
wife's estate, they would have to sue in New York. It did, however,
assert jurisdiction over the Louisiana real estate, and declared it
community property so that the heirs, not the surviving husband,
took the decedent's interest in it. In reality, the Louisiana court
42Tomaier v. Tomaier, 23 Cal. 2d 754, 146 P.2d 905 (1944); King v. Bruce, 145 Tex.
647, 201 S.W.2d 803, cert. denied, 332 U.S. 769, rehearing denied, 332 U.S. 820 (1947);
RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §292 (1934).
43 MASON, THE MIGRANT EXECUTIVE: COMMUNITY PROPERTY; EFFECT OF MULTIPLE
RESIDENCE; PRESUMPTIONS, 31 INSTITUTE ON FEDERAL TAXATION 1001 (1973), at
1009.
"Quintana v. Ordono, 195 So. 2d 577 (Fla. Ct. App. 1967); Rozan v. Rosen, 431 P.2d
870 (Mont. 1967).
459 Rob. (La.) 438,41 Am. Dec. 341 (1845).
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hedged somewhat on the personal property. The court specifically said
that the move out of the community property jurisdiction did not
affect the community status of the personalty; in the same breath,
however, they held it subject to the New York laws of succession.
In the second Packwood case,46 involving the same husband, the
same heirs, but different property, the husband and wife held stock
in a Louisiana bank. The stock was not fully paid, and was secured
by a mortgage on some Louisiana land. In addition there was some
unsold land in Louisiana, unencumbered by the mortgage. The heirs
contended that the land was still part of the community even though
after the move to New York, the husband had sold it with the wife
joining in the sale, and he had then reacquired it after the wife's
death. The court held that the stock was still community because it
was secured by an interest in Louisiana community real estate. With
respect to the reacquired real estate, the court held that it was the
separate property of the husband, there being no evidence presented
that the initial sale by the couple was for the purpose of defrauding
the wife.
In another Louisiana case some seventy-five years later,47 a mar-
ried couple held securities in Louisiana, in community. They moved
to Mississippi, but left the securities in a bank in New Orleans. When
the wife died, Louisiana assessed a succession tax. The husband
argued that it was the couple's intention to sever the community as
to the stock, especially since Mississippi law declared it and other
personalty to be the property of the husband. Citing Packwood, the
court predictably held that the community was not destroyed by the
move, and held further that even though its devolution might be
controlled by Mississippi law, it could still be taxed by Louisiana,
especially since the property was still there.
The two cases are alike only in the holding that change of
domicile does not in and of itself change community property inter-
ests. The results, however, differ in effect at least as to personalty,
in light of the Packwood court's insistence that the heirs use the
courts of a non-community state to enforce the community property
rights.
If the community property moves with the persons, the diffi-
culties redouble. In Doss v. Campbell,4 the couple was married in
Texas. The wife had separate property. They then moved to Alabama,
where the husband had a number of debt judgments taken against
him. The judgment creditors attempted to attach the property of the
412 Rob. (La.) 334, 43 Am. Dec. 230 (1845).
47 Succession of Popp, 146 La. 464, 83 So. 765 (1920).
4819 Ala. 590, 54 Am. Dec. 198 (1851).
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wife, as being partly the husband's. The Alabama court held that as
to that property, Texas law governed; it was the wife's property
even under community property laws, and the simple fact of the
move to Alabama did not alter the character of the property. The
law of matrimonial domicile, rather than the law of present domicile,
controlled in Doss v. Campbell, and even though it would have served
the best interests of the Alabama creditors for the court to have de-
clared the property to be community, it chose to respect the pro-
visions of Texas community property law which dictated that prop-
erty held by one spouse before marriage, retained its character as
separate property. The courts of other states, as will be seen, have
not taken the same pains to give credence to the laws of community
property states.
Ohio and Virginia have placed their own peculiar twists on the
law in the area, in what can only be described as questionable cases.
In In re Estate of Kessler49 a married couple owned stock in Cali-
fornia in community. They moved to Ohio and took the stock with
them. The husband died thereafter, with the stock in his name as it
had always been, but considering it to be community. Ohio attempted
to tax the entire amount, rather than only the half interest that the
husband had had under the community laws. The Ohio Supreme
Court ruled that indeed half was the husband's and half was the
wife's, since the mere fact of the move did not change the com-
munity interests, but that because the wife's interest became pure
and untainted by the community interests of the husband only upon
his death, the property was subject to the Ohio succession tax. The
interests of the husband to which the Court referred were those of
management and control, commonplace in all community states, and
considered a real ownership interest in none of them. The Ohio Su-
preme Court's unfortunate misinterpretation of the husband's rights
of management and control, used to affix Ohio succession tax lia-
bility, is hardly mitigated by the court's nodding recognition that
the property retained its community character. As far as Mrs. Kes-
sler was concerned, the important part was that the Ohio Depart-
ment of Taxation got its way. To further complicate matters, Kessler
was a four-three decision, has engendered much criticism, and may
some day be overruled.
In the Virginia case, Commonwealth v. Terjen,50 the married
couple moved from California to Virginia, and used community funds
to purchase a home in the wife's name. The husband filed a gift tax
return for the half interest he had which went to his spouse upon
the purchase of the Virginia home in her name only. Virginia as-
49 177 Ohio St. 136, 203 N.E.2d 221 (1964).
"1 197 Va. 596, 90 S.E.2d 801 (1956).
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sessed tax on the entire value, denying that the wife had any "real"
interest in California, since the husband had statutory management
and control. The Virginia court agreed, despite clear California law 5
to the contrary, giving the wife a present, existing, equal interest in
the community property.
These two cases were decided the way they were for two reasons:
revenue for the states involved, and lack of familiarity with com-
munity property law by all concerned, including justices and counsel.
Fortunately, not all non-community law state courts misinter-
pret community property rights as did the state courts of Ohio and
Virginia. Colorado is an excellent example. In People v. Bejarano,52
the husband received pension and profit sharing contributions from
his employer while in both Texas and California. The couple then
moved to Colorado where the husband died. Colorado attempted to
tax all of the benefits in the deceased's estate. His surviving spouse,
of course, wanted exclusion of half of them. The court rejected the
state's argument that a valuable right passed to the wife upon her
spouse's death, and correctly reasoned that under the California and
Texas statutes defining and governing community property, the wife
had a current coequal interest with her husband so that her half was
not taxable in his estate.
The moral of this mini-survey of cases is that when a married
couple moves from a community property state to a common law
state, counsel can never take it for granted either that the community
interests remain the same, or even that they change. The new state
may ignore the community and call it the property of one or the other,
especially if tax revenue is at stake. It is absolutely necessary for the
estate planner to check the law of the new state, and to be especially
careful in Ohio and Virginia.
It is difficult to outline what the best course of action is, once a
move from a community state to a non-community state has taken
place. Some of this difficulty arises because the financial situation of
the married couple will often dictate a course of action different from
what counsel would otherwise recommend if the clients were finan-
cially independent. In general, if the property must be sold, especially
at a gain in the case of a residence, counsel should try to maintain
the community character of the proceeds if they are reinvested in
another asset which is likely to appreciate in value, perhaps by means
of a written agreement between the spouses, to protect the step-up
in basis upon the death of one or the other. Counsel should be pre-
pared to intelligently argue that the new state should recognize the
community.
51 CAL. CIV. CODE §161a (Deering 1960).
52 145 Colo. 304, 358 P.2d 866 (1961).
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If the couple is wealthy enough to leave the community property
unsold and in the community state, that is probably the safest course
if the desire is to maintain the community character. That scheme,
however, raises problems of its own. If the succession taxes of the
community state are sufficiently high, it may be economically dis-
advantageous to leave the property there. What is more, there may
be additional costs of ancillary administration in that state. To avoid
that possibility, the property can be deeded by inter vivos gift to a
resident of the community state if the couple has no reluctance to
part with it, or it might be put into trust in the community state
for the benefit of children or others, with life estates being retained
for the benefit of the husband and wife if they still wish to use it.
In any case, the property should as clearly as possible be denoted
either community or non-community, and as property of one state or
the other, according to the wishes and the estate planning needs of
the couple. It is impossible to say that any one scheme is always bet-
ter than any other, no matter what the circumstances.
It is safe to say that in most cases, it will be necessary to convert
the community property upon a move out of a community state, from
economic necessity of the couple. It should be noted that conversion
from community to separate property is not taxable per se,53 nor
is it a gift if the property is divided equally.5 4 It is essential, however,
that the property be "traced."
The first step of the estate planner for the couple that moves
from a community property state to a non-community property state,
having sold some or all of their community property assets, is to
identify the items formally held as community property. This task
may be very difficult if the clients have not kept adequate track of
the movement of the funds and the property. Next, it should be
determined which items presently held as separate property were
purchased with the proceeds of the sale of community property. It
must be recalled that these items may not be included in a decedent's
adjusted gross estate for marital deduction purposes. Further, IRS
may posit a gift of one spouse's half to the other, if adequate tracing
is not available.55 Note, however, that if this happens and a return
is filed and gift tax paid, that half may be figured in computing ad-
justed gross estate for marital deduction purposes, as the vestiges of
community have been destroyed upon payment of the gift tax.
A very real danger of the planner's failure to inquire about com-
munity property is that he may proceed to set up a plan of inter
vivos gifts from husband to wife when all of the property is in the
S3 Walz v. Commissioner, 32 B.T.A. 718 (1935).
54Commissioner v. Mills, 183 F.2d 32 (9th Cir. 1950).
55 Perkins v .Commissioner, 1 T.C. 982 (1943).
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husband's name, when the wife may already have a community prop-
erty one-half. This may create an undesirable imbalance in favor of
the wife, and may trigger the payment of possibly unnecessary gift
and estate taxes. Moreover, if there has been or will be appreciation,
it may be advantageous to recognize the community status and leave
the property in community to take advantage of the step-up in basis,
as has been previously noted.
At this point, the planner should give general consideration to
the form of title in which the assets are to be held in the non-com-
munity state, if the decision has been to sell the property in the
community property state. While it is outside the scope of this note
to present an all-encompassing discussion of the merits and demerits
of each of the various forms of title, some brief mention of likely
trouble spots might prove helpful.
Conversion to joint tenancy or tenancy by the entireties (if pos-
sible) is probably the least desirable of the alternatives. The effect,
under §2040 of the Internal Revenue Code, will be to automatically
include all of the property in the estate of the first to die, in effect
grossly overqualifying for the marital deduction, possibly resulting
in double or triple the estate tax liability if the surviving spouse is
unable to dispose of the property before death. Should it transpire
that counsel's first contact with the estate plan occurs at the death
of the first spouse and the former community property is held in
joint tenancy, counsel can legitimately argue upon the Internal Reve-
nue Service's attempt to include all of the property in the estate of
the first to die under §2040, that there is a presumption that both
the husband and wife contributed equally to the purchase price of
the subsequently acquired property, since it was once held half-and-
half by statute, and that each spouse contributed his or her half to
acquire the new property.56 Such an argument makes logical sense,
for had the couple stayed in the community property jurisdiction,
only one-half would have passed through the decedent's estate. There
is no good reason for penalizing those who have moved.
Conversion to tenancy in common is generally a better way to
proceed. Unfortunately, it, too, has its risks. If, as is often the case,
the community property is nominally held by one spouse, if upon its
sale title to the new property is taken in the name of the same spouse,
and if at that point the desire is to convert it to a tenancy in com-
mon, the normal procedure is for the titleholder to quit-claim an un-
divided one-half interest to the spouse. If at the death of one spouse
the common law state does recognize the former community, it will
then insist that one owns three-quarters, and that one owns one-
6 Panel, supra note 39, at 416.
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quarter, thus possibly overqualifying or underqualifying for the
marital deduction, depending upon who dies first. In such a situation,
it would be advisable to provide in a written instrument (perhaps
the deed itself) that it is the intent of the parties to simply sever the
community, and that each owns one-half. Such a technique would
have the ancillary benefit of lessening the possibility of imposition
of gift tax.
Further, before finally deciding upon equal division, it is wise to
check the amounts of separate property that each spouse may own.
If either owns a significant amount of separate property, then there
can be an alteration of the division to maximize the estate tax bene-
fits. Such a procedure may have gift tax consequences, but when
faced with a choice between gift tax and estate tax, the gift tax
is the better option, assuming the clients have the funds on hand to
pay the tax. Similarly, if division is found necessary, it is better to
separate, when possible, into undivided halves in all, rather than allo-
cating some parts to the husband and some to the wife, especially in
the case of appreciated property, lest the gain be recognized at that
point. There is authority that it will not be a sale or exchange,57 and
it is as easy, and certainly surer, to divide to a tenancy in common.
Assuming it has been decided that it is desirable (and possible)
to get the estates substantially equal, it should be noted that the
marital deduction has in effect been taken at that point, and that
under the rules described in the foregoing discussion, it is not then
possible to take the marital deduction again, when one of the two
dies, as to property which came out of the community.58
At this point, "normal" estate planning, including establish-
ment of trusts for children, income to surviving spouse (if desired),
and other special arrangements to accommodate the particular needs
of the husband and wife, can be considered.
Migration From Common Law to Community Property States
If a move to a community property state is intended at the time
of marriage in a common law state, the laws of the community prop-
erty state will govern when the move is made. 59 Subsequent acquisi-
tions of realty or personalty are governed by the laws of the state
to which the couple moves.60 The status of personalty previously
acquired is determined by the law of the jurisdiction that was the
57 Walz v. Commissioner, 32 B.T.A. 718 (1935).
58 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§2056(c) (2) (B) (ii), 2056(c) (2) (C) (i).
59 Doss v. Campbell, 19 Ala. 590, 54 Am. Dec. 198 (1851).
60 Id.; Castro v. Illies, 22 Tex. 479 (1858).
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couple's domicile when the property was acquired.61 Separate prop-
erty in one state does not automatically become community property
if a move is made into a community state,62 but it is extremely im-
portant if the character of separateness is to be maintained, that the
husband and wife be warned against commingling, which will de-
stroy separateness.6
The most common situation occurs when, after the move, hus-
band and wife aggregate their personal property to purchase realty
in the community state. There is a split of authority as to whether
such action in and of itself transmutes separate property into com-
munity property." If separate character is to be maintained, partic-
ularly if the planner has already taken great pains to create an
intentional imbalance for one reason or another, such as disparity in
age between husband and wife, a written agreement to maintain
separateness is a sound idea.
Most often there is no written agreement, thus leaving the
parties at the mercy of the courts of the community property states.
The results vary, as the following examples from California and
Texas demonstrate.
Originally, the law in California was announced in Kraemer v.
Kraemer.65 In that case, a married couple had accumulated cash dur-
ing coverture in Illinois, and under Illinois law it was considered the
separate property of the husband. Although it was used to buy real
property in California with no effort to retain its character as sepa-
rate property, the California Supreme Court held that it was still the
separate property of the husband, and that the mere fact of the move
failed to work a transmutation.
Some time later, the California legislature enacted their "quasi-
community" statute, which indicates that personal property acquired
anywhere, and real property acquired in California, by a couple after
marriage but while living somewhere other than California, which
would have been community property if the couple were living in
61 Slocomb v. Breedlove, 8 La. 143, 28 Am. Dec. 135 (1835); Blethen v. Bonner, 30 Tex.
Civ. App. 585, 71 S.W. 290 (1902); Castro v. Illies, 22 Tex. 479 (1858).
62 1, re Thornton's Estate, 1 Cal. 2d 1, 33 P.2d 1 (1934), questioned in Addison v. Ad-
dison, 62 Cal. 2d 558, 399 P.2d 897, 43 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1965); In re Estate of Kessler,
177 Ohio St. 136, 203 N.E.2d 221 (1964).
63 The concept of commingling, and its effect, is of incalculable importance in estate plan-
ning wherein a community property jurisdiction is, has been, or will be involved. For this
reason, additional discussion of the area appears at text accompanying notes 74-78 infra.
"Minnich v. Minnich, 127 Cal. App. 1, 15 P.2d 804 (1932); Brookman v. Durkee, 46
Wash. 578, 90 P. 914 (1907).
65 52 Cal. 302 (1877).
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California, will be treated as community property upon the death of
either,66 and upon a decree for separate maintenance or divorce67 or
child support.68
The pronouncements of the courts and of the legislature of Cali-
fornia are inconsistent, and somewhat confusing. According to one
text writer,69 California cannot exact a wholesale transmutation of
separate property to community property, since this would force a
possibly unwanted alteration of property interests upon persons
merely moving into California, clearly violative of the privileges and
immunities clause of the fourteenth amendment to the U.S. Constitu-
tion. 70 And yet it is clear from the enactment of the quasi-community
statute cited above, that California will exercise the opportunity to
convert such property unless faced with unequivocal intent of the
parties to keep it separate. A writing would probably help; estab-
lishment of a trust for the benefit of one spouse or the other before
the move would also help; in any case, indiscriminate commingling
would almost certainly result in conversion to community property.
In Texas, there is a rebuttable presumption that property owned
in that state by either or both spouses is community property. Texas
courts will not take judicial notice of the laws of the state from
which the couple came71 and, if presented with controversy on the
subject, Texas courts will refuse to make an automatic conversion
from separate property to community property when evidence is pre-
sented that according to the law of the state from which the husband
and wife came, the property in question was the separate property of
one or the other.
The Texas Court of Civil Appeals in Blethen v. Bonner72 held
that property purchased in Texas in a husband's own name with
$25,000 he brought with him from Massachusetts, where it was his
separate property by statute, did become community property merely
because he was married at the time. It so held because the husband
offered as evidence the fact that under Massachusetts law, the
$25,000.00 was his separate property. The court chided Massachu-
setts for retaining such "barbarism . . .of the common law . ..."73
but held the property to be separate property, despite its feelings.
Presumably, had not the husband offered proof of the law of Massa-
chusetts, the presumption of community would have prevailed.
6CAL. PROB. CODE §201.5 (Deering Supp. 1974).
67 CAL. CIV. CODE §4800 (Deering Supp. 1974).
-Id. §4807.
69 N. LAY, supra note 1, at 242.
70ln re Thornton's Estate, 1 Cal. 2d 1, 33 P.2d 1 (1934).
71 Griffin v. McKinney, 25 Tex. Civ. App. 432, 62 S.W. 78 (1901).
7230 Tex. Civ. App. 585, 71 S.W. 290 (1902).
73Id. at 586, 71 S.W. at 291.
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On balance, it is best to take advantage of the availability of
community property status if it is available, especially if apprecia-
tion in the value of the assets is anticipated. If there is no good
reason for creating or maintaining imbalance, conversion to com-
munity property status (by commingling, not by gift) is generally
advantageous insofar as it provides "automatic" election of the maxi-
mum marital deduction. Should the clients revise their estate plan
at some point in the future without the advice of counsel, the marital
deduction provisions can easily be overlooked. It will be of some com-
fort to the estate planner to know that even if his work is undone,
the clients will still have the benefits afforded by the community
property laws. The best method of conversion to community prop-
erty is by commingling separate property. Conversely, commingling
is so effective that if separateness of property is desired, especially
to maintain a purposeful imbalance, the couple should execute a
writing agreeing to maintain the separateness, commingling should
be carefully avoided, and counsel in the community property state
should be retained if any changes in the estate plan or the couple's
financial position are anticipated.
It should be kept in mind, however, that such a failure to convert
separate property has inherent risks in all community property jur-
isdictions except California. If, as an example, all of the property
is in the name of the husband and the move to the community state
is accomplished, whatever statutory or non-barrable shares the wife
used to have in the common law state, are gone. If the husband's will
left his property to someone other than his wife and no provisions
were made for conversion to community, even by way of intentional
commingling, the wife may take nothing. Of course, the longer the
period between the move and the husband's death, the greater the
chance that the couple would have acquired more property by way
of the husband's earnings, half of which (assuming there is any
left) belongs to the wife.
California Probate Code §201.5 eliminates the danger of such a
situation by specifying that a wife may take her community prop-
erty share of any property acquired by the couple during marriage,
in a noncommunity state. California, however, is the only com-
munity property state that has such a provision.
Quite simply and quite generally, commingling the separate
property of husband and wife will result in conversion of the prop-
erty to community, unless great pains are taken to retain the sepa-
rate identity of the property so commingled.74 Similarly, separate
74 Kelsey v. Miller, 203 Cal. 96, 263 P. 213 (1928); Lawson v. Ridgeway, 72 Ariz. 253,
233 P.2d 459 (1951).
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property that is commingled with community property becomes com-
munity property, unless the community portion is insubstantial in
relation to the separate property.7 5
The more liquid the asset, the easier it will be to commingle,
and the greater the care that should be taken if separateness is to be
maintained. Obviously, the most liquid asset is cash, and if for any
reason a husband and wife wish to retain their separate bank de-
posits as separate property, the temptation to consolidate them into
one bank account for ease of record-keeping, or even for greater
return (as in the case of certificates of deposit) should be studiously
avoided.
In the case of stock, adequate records of the shares held by each
spouse, to include certificate numbers, should be kept. In the case of
realty, title can be held as tenants in common, with specific reference
to the share each holds, in proportion to the separate funds each con-
tributed toward the purchase price. When possible, a written agree-
ment should be drafted, setting out the intention of the parties not to
commingle the funds, to retain the separate identity of the share of
each, and only to consolidate the funds or the property for a specific
purpose, such as accumulation of an amount sufficient to aggregate the
purchase price of a specific piece of realty. There is never any guar-
antee that such a written instrument will hold sway with a court in a
community property jurisdiction bent on finding a commingling, but
it cannot hurt.
One particular type of such written agreement which has found
favor, is the antenuptial agreement. Generally, such an agreement will
prevail over local community property law, unless found contrary to
public policy, or unless the citizens of the community property state
would suffer.76 As an example, if a spendthrift husband and a wealthy
wife are married in New York after execution of an antenuptial agree-
ment stating that the wife's separate property is forever to remain
her separate property, and the couple then moves to California and
the husband incurs a mountain of debt on the strength of what the
California creditors reasonably assume is a substantial amount of com-
munity property, the California courts would probably have no diffi-
culty in finding prejudice to its citizens, to avoid the effect of the pri-
vate agreement and subject the property of the wife to attachment in
satisfaction of the debts of her husband.
Similarly, while it is even possible for a couple to specify before
marriage that property acquired after marriage will be separate prop-
erty, courts of community property states can look through these
7sIn re Cudworth's Estate, 133 Cal. 462, 65 P. 1041 (1901); Catron v. First Natl. Bk. &
Tr. Co., 434 P.2d 263 (Okla. 1967).
76 Castro v Illies, 22 Tex. 479 (1858).
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agreements and term the property community if the rights of con-
tracting third parties in the community state are prejudiced by the
agreement.7
The chances are excellent that without careful planning, conver-
sions from separate to community property will take place in the great
majority of cases. The question obviously arises when one spouse
parts with an interest and the other spouse gains an interest: what
about gift taxes? Peculiarly enough, as common as conversions from
separate property to community would seem to be, there seems to be
a dearth of law on the subject. One article78 indicates, without citing
authority, that an intentional transfer from one spouse into commu-
nity would be a taxable gift. Such a conculsion would seem only to
make sense, from a reading of the gift tax sections of the Internal
Revenue Code, §§2501 et seq.
The simple and logical answer would seem to be that if a move
from a common law state to a community property state is contem-
plated, and if the husband and wife either desire to have the property
converted, or at least have no objection to its being so converted, they
should either do nothing or should perhaps intentionally commingle
their separate property, so that the conversion takes place by opera-
tion of law rather than clearly by gift.
Miscellaneous Considerations For The Migrating Client
While it possible for the attorney planning the estate of a non-
migrant to encounter a situation in which the client has a residence
in each of more than one state, the probability is increased somewhat
in the case of the migrant client, especially if it is the latter's desire
after a move from a community property state to retain property in
that community state for basis purposes, as previously mentioned. In
all cases of multiple domicile, counsel should always attempt to re-
solve the question. A fairly simple method is to place all residences
other than the primary one into a trust or trusts for the benefit of the
owner, with the trustee in the state in which the property is located,
to avoid ambiguity and ancillary administration. 9
The following two cases are mentioned not so much for their in-
structional value, as for their interesting and nearly amazing facts
and results. In re Dorrance's Estate80 and Dorrance's Estate"l involved
attempts by Pennsylvania and New Jersey, respectively, to admin-
71d.
78 Panel, supra note 39, at 425.
79 MASON, supra note 43, at 1024.
80309 Pa. 151, 163 A. 303 (1932), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 393 (1935).
91116 N.J. Eq. 204, 172 A.503 (1934), supplementing 115 N.J. Eq. 268, 170 A. 601
(1934), af'd, 13 N.J. Misc. 168, 176 A. 902 (1935).
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ister the estate of the decedent, Dorrance. The Supreme Court of the
United States refused to hear the matter to resolve the dispute, and
as a result, both states administered Dorrance's estate and taxed it
in the bargain, with the result that it cost Dorrance's estate an extra
thirteen million dollars in taxes. Had Texas v. Florida,82 a similar dis-
pute involving four states, not been resolved by the Supreme Court as it
was, there would have been total estate tax liability of thirty-seven
million dollars on a thirty-six million dollar estate.
In general, the gift taxes, income taxes, and capital gains taxes
of the state of anticipated domicile of a migratory client must be
checked to see whether it will be worthwhile to shift property from
state to state, or to leave the property in a particular state. In addition,
it is necessary to make certain that the client is familiar with the
provisions of Internal Revenue Code §217, regarding moving expenses.
If sale of the client's residence has been or will be effected, the rules
regarding non-recognition of gain under Code §1034 should be called
to his attention.
Conclusion
To assume that every practicing attorney will someday be called
upon to plan the estates of a married couple that has held or will hold
property in community, would be unrealistic. To err in the other
direction, however, and assume that since the attorney practices in
a non-community state he will never encounter community property
laws, is equally unrealistic. To be unable to recognize community prop-
erty considerations when they exist, or to recognize them and be
unable to properly deal with them, would clearly amount to malprac-
tice if the clients suffer economic detriment as a result. Most of the
areas of difficulty have been set forth herein. If they can be recognized
and dealt with, both the attorney and the migrating client will benefit.
If the only result is recognition of the problem and referral to a prac-
titioner with expertise in the area, the best interests of the client will
still have been served.
Frank J. Cumberland, Jr.
82306 U.S. 398 (1939).
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